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Abstract
A functional analysis of the task of observing multiple macroscopic quantum sys-
tems over an extended period of time and then reporting the accumulated results is
used to investigate the information that must be encoded in the “ready” state |Or 〉
of any finite, macroscopic observer O capable of performing this task. Decoherence
considerations show that this task can be considered as involving local observations
under classical conditions (LOCC), allowing the use of classical automata theory to
define a minimal observer. It is shown that such a minimal observer must implement
a functional architecture equivalent to a classical Turing machine and must encode
in |Or 〉 a classical specification of the complete set of reportable apparatus states.
The observation task is then re-characterized employing an explicit model of such a
minimal observer, and it is shown that both the assumption that external systems
have well-defined boundaries against the environment and the assumption of deco-
herence are unnecessary for the characterization of measurements made by a minimal
observer. It is shown that the observables available to a minimal observer are positive
operator-valued measures (POVMs) and that the measurement results reported by a
minimal observer comply with the Born rule. The differences in underlying physical
assumptions between this “systems-free” treatment of observation and that tradition-
ally employed in analyses of quantum measurement and quantum communication are
discussed.
Keywords: Measurement; minimal observer; Born rule; decoherence; Turing-equivalent
architecture; quantum Darwinism. PACSS: 03.65.Ca; 03.65.Ta; 03.65.Yz
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1 Introduction
Consider a finite, macroscopic quantum system O, an “observer”, that interacts via a
common channel E , the shared environment, with N macroscopic quantum systems Ai .
Assume the systems Ai are sufficiently separated to be mutually decoupled, and that each
serves as an “apparatus” in the sense that only a small projection of its overall state, which
to avoid ambiguity will be referred to as its “read-out” component Ri , is of interest to O.
The task ofO is to observe theAi for an extended period of time, long enough for each of the
Ai to undergo numerous state transitions, and then to report the states of the Ri that have
been observed. This paper addresses two questions about any physical system O capable of
carrying out this task. First, what information must O encode at the outset of the period of
observation, i.e. in a “ready” state |Or〉, in order to complete this task successfully? Second,
into what functional architecture must this prior information be organized to enable O both
to carry out the observations and to report the results? It shows that these questions can
be answered precisely, and that the answers have significant consequences for the physical
description of measurement. It shows, in particular, that quantum measurement can be
completely described within a “systems-free” formulation that does not assume well-defined
boundaries between the Ai and the surrounding environment E and does not depend on
either the physical assumptions or the formalism of decoherence.
The question of what information observers must encode in order to conduct observations
and report the results has generally been avoided in discussions of quantum measurement.
In a widely-cited review of decoherence, Zurek [1] remarks that observers differ from ap-
paratus only in their ability to “readily consult the content of their memory” (p. 759),
but nowhere specifies either what memory contents are consulted or what memory con-
tents might be required. In the formal context of the “environment as witness” [2, 3] and
quantum Darwinism [4, 5, 6] programs, prior knowledge on the part of observers and even
observers themselves appear superfluous; the pointer states of all possible systems of in-
terest are einselected by decohering interactions and encoded by the environment at much
higher redundancy and hence greater robustness against decay than could be achieved by
any finite observer. Observers in this context are merely localized recipients of information,
their state transitions driven by the environment in the same way that they are driven by
the apparatus in the traditional representation of the von Neumann chain (e.g. [7, 8]).
In reformulations of measurement as a quantum communication process, the state of Bob
the receiver is similarly treated as driven by the quantum communication channel through
which Alice the sender transmits messages (e.g. [9, 10]); while Bob must sometimes perform
operations to decode a message, the instructions for performing these operations also come,
via a parallel classical channel, from Alice. Such passive observers can be altogether re-
placed by sequences of conditional probabilities of potential measurement outcomes; doing
so clearly obviates any questions regarding what information observer states might encode,
and is often considered a clarification of quantum measurement (e.g. [11]). Even when
quantum states are considered fully “subjective” and measurement is conceptualized as a
process of belief revision by agents faced with new information, the question of what infor-
mation an agent must encode to enable such belief revision is considered otiose: “it is not
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the task of [the] theory to explain how the transition [it] signifies comes about within the
mind of the agent” ([12], p. 1015).
This paper shows that neglecting the requirements placed on the observer by the pragmatic
task of observation has both obscured the role of decoherence in the environmental en-
coding of pointer states and needlessly complicated the analysis of quantum measurement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the physical assumptions
that must be made in order to characterize the transfer of information from a macroscopic
apparatus A to a macroscopic observer O are examined using the standard language of
decoherence. The roles played by the assumptions of einselection and that the environment
E serves as a “witness” that encodes the pointer states of A are reviewed. It is shown
that under these assumptions, measurement interactions can be characterized as local ob-
servations with classical communication (LOCC), and hence as resulting in O possessing
localized classical information. A functional decomposition of the task of observing multiple
macroscopic systems Ai under LOCC conditions is used to define both the minimal classi-
cal information that must be encoded by the ready state |Or〉 and the minimal functional
architecture that must be implemented by any finite observer O capable of observing the
read-outs Ri of any finite set of macroscopic quantum systems Ai embedded in an environ-
ment E . The “minimal observer” O defined by this task analysis has, not surprisingly, the
capabilities and structure of a typical laboratory data-collection system implemented on a
typical laboratory computer. In Section 3, the physical assumptions made in characterizing
the task of observing multiple systems Ai are progressively relaxed, and it is shown that
the minimal observer O can be represented as interacting with the quantum environment
E without the need for any assumptions regarding the external systems Ai or their interac-
tions with E . The observables available to O in this “systems-free” formulation are defined
and shown to be positive operator-valued measures (POVMs). A variation of Zurek’s proof
from envariance [13] is used to show that observations made with these observables obey the
Born rule. This proof employs only the systems-free formulation and is independent of any
assumptions regarding decoherence, einselection, or the interaction of external systems with
the environment; hence it shows that classical observers can be expected to report results
consistent with quantum mechanics solely in virtue of their functional architectures and the
information encoded in |Or〉. The implications of these facts for the physical interpretations
of both quantum and classical mechanics are discussed in Sect. 4.
2 Task analysis defines a minimal observer
The fundamental insight of decoherence theory is that observers inhabit an environment,
and that the transfer of information from a quantum system A to an observer O - that
is, measurement - therefore requires that A be open to interaction with this environment
[1, 7, 8]. For the present purposes, both A and O are assumed to be macroscopic, and the
environment E is assumed to be large enough to contain many such systems and observers
and to have sufficiently many degrees of freedom to impose strong decoherence.
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Interposing a strongly-decohering environment between apparatus and observer replaces
the traditional von Neumann chain:
(
∑
k
λk|sk〉)|A
i〉|Or〉 →
∑
k
λk |sk〉|ak〉|ok〉 → |sf 〉|af 〉|of 〉 (1)
with its implications of direct system-apparatus-observer entanglement followed by non-
unitary “collapse” or unitary “branching” into a final joint eigenstate |sf〉|af〉|of〉 (e.g.
[7, 8]) by two decoupled processes:
(
∑
k
λk|sk〉)|A
i〉|E i〉 →
∑
k
λk |sk〉|ak〉|ek〉 → |sf 〉|af 〉|ef 〉 (2)
and
|e′f〉|O
r〉 → |e ′f 〉|of 〉 (3)
mediated by E . Here |Ai〉 and |E i〉 refer to unmeasured initial states of the apparatus
and the environment, and in line with tradition A is represented as monitoring the states
of a distinct, microscopic quantum system described by basis vectors {|sk〉}. Because the
environment separates A from O and prevents their coherent entanglement, the O − E
interaction occurs slightly later than and at some remove from the A− E interaction; this
is reflected in Eqn. 3 by |e′f 〉 indicating a time-propagated descendent of |ef〉.
The first of these two processes, represented by Eqn. 2, has the same form as the traditional
von Neumann chain, with the sole difference that E has replaced O in the role of observer. If
no further physical assumptions are made, the choice of basis vectors |sk〉 remains arbitrary,
and the assumption of strong decoherence has no impact on the description of measurement
(e.g. [14]). The concept of einselection [1, 15, 16] is based on the realization that, in any
practical observational context, the specification of |E i〉 involves the physically-significant
assumption of a particular A− E interaction, e.g. scattering of ambient photons or immer-
sion in a heat bath. Specification of the A− E interaction implicitly specifies the states
of A that can be observed non-destructively, and hence implicitly specifies a basis for A,
e.g. position in the case of photon scattering or energy in the case of heat-bath immersion.
These implicit specifications can be made explicit by specifying the einselected basis of A,
i.e. by re-writing Eqn. 2 as:
|S i〉(
∑
k
λ′k |ak〉)|E
i〉 → |sf 〉|af 〉|ef 〉 (4)
where |S i〉 is the unmeasured and for all practical purposes irrelevant initial state of the mi-
croscopic system and the |ak〉 are eigenvectors of the A− E interaction Hamiltonian HA−E .
From this “environment as witness” perspective, the assumption of strong decoherence does
affect the description of measurement: it fixes the basis for the joint state |sf〉|af〉|ef〉 as
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the eigenbasis {|ak〉} of HA−E , requires |af〉 to be an eigenstate in this basis, and allows the
final environmental state |ef〉 to be regarded as an “encoding” of |af〉 in this basis [2, 3].
Within the environment as witness formulation, Eqn. 3 is merely an afterthought; the
observer plays no role in fixing the basis {|ak〉} [1]. The time-propagated environmental
encoding |e′f 〉 imposes the final observer state |of〉 on O by einselection [1, 6]. The exclusive
role of the environment in fixing the einselected basis is systematically obscured by the
common practice of using a partial trace over E to effectively collapse Eqns. 3 and 4 back
to a “decohered” version of Eqn. 1 in which {|ak〉} replaces {|sk〉} as the explicit basis.
As noted by Zurek [1], such a partial trace assumes the Born rule and hence also obscures,
by treating the Born rule as a mathematical axiom, the physical origin of the probabilities
defined over quantum-mechanical observables.
The reformulation of Eqn. 2, where the choice of basis is unspecified, to Eqn. 4, where
it is specified, requires an explicit basis {|ak〉} for the macroscopic system A. It therefore
rests on the assumption that the macroscopic boundary between A and E is well defined,
either by an explicit boundary condition on HA−E or by an explicit specification of matrix
elements 〈ai|HA−E |ej 〉. However, neither decoherence theory nor its extension to quantum
Darwinism provides a method for calculating either macroscopic boundary conditions or
explicit matrix elements using only quantum-mechanical assumptions and the results of non-
destructive measurements [17, 18]; classical assumptions must be employed to distinguish
A from E in either case. While the requirement that a distinction between A and E
must be made in order to define HA−E has been broadly noted, the requirement that this
distinction be stated in classical terms has not. Zurek, for example, elevates to the status of
“axiom(o)” of quantum mechanics the assumption that there are “systems” distinguishable
by boundaries at which decoherence acts ([1], p. 746; [5], p. 3), but fails to note that in
the absence of a purely quantum-mechanical method for calculating macroscopic boundary
conditions or specifying explicit matrix elements, an instance of this axiom is required for
every macroscopic object. It is not unreasonable to ask why this is the case, to ask why the
description of measurement using decoherence requires as an axiom the assumption that
my old Geiger counter, for example, exists as a system. In order to answer this question, we
ask a different one: what are the physical assumptions implicit in the afterthought, Eqn. 3,
that describes the interaction between the environment and an observer? Answering this
question requires specifying what the interaction called “observation” is.
If E imposes strong decoherence, Eqn. 3 describes effectively classical information transfer:
the interaction between O and E changes the state of O but leaves E effectively unaltered.
The final observer state |of〉, in particular, is einselected as an eigenstate of the O − E
interaction and hence is effectively classical. Provisionally assuming that both the A− E
and O − E interactions are well defined allows Eqn. 3 to be provisionally accepted as a
description of classical information transfer and the scenario in the Introduction to be re-
formulated as a communication task in LOCC terms. Each of the Ai becomes a transmitter
of classical messages through a common channel E to a receiver O. The kth message from
Ai contains a value rik of the read-out Ri , together with an identifier and possibly other
information (e.g. operating temperature, expected battery life, etc.) about the state of
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Ai . The task of O is to accumulate multiple messages from each sender and then, at the
end of the observation period, to report the accumulated values rik, with each value tagged
by the identity of the sender. For simplicity, the messages are assumed to be composed
of discrete classical bits received by O sequentially and without noise or overlap. While
observing the string of bits coming from E , O must 1) parse them into syntactically well-
formed messages identified by sender, and 2) extract from each message the read-out value
rik to be recorded. These tasks are distinct and must be performed sequentially, as the
read-out values transmitted by distinct apparatus Ai and Aj may be indistinguishable;
both Ai and Aj may, for example, transmit the read-out value “2”. On the assumption
that E has at least the computational complexity of a classical finite state machine, classical
automata theory demonstrates that these two tasks are non-trivial and that they cannot be
performed without prior information: O cannot define, from any finite sample of input from
E , either the bit patterns that distinguish well-formed messages from each sender or which
bits within each well-formed message encode content to be recorded, even if O is permitted
finite diagnostic inputs to the Ai [19]. The parsers required to identify well-formed mes-
sages by sender and extract the read-out values must, therefore, be encoded by any system
- any “minimal observer” - capable of carrying out the task of observation as described. A
classical Bob cannot, therefore, receive all of the instructions necessary for decoding Alice’s
transmissions from Alice; classical automata theory requires that Bob must encode the
parsers that enable the recognition of Alice’s transmissions in advance. This requirement
for advance “knowledge” results solely from the imposition of LOCC; in the absence of
direct Alice-Bob entanglement, i.e. in the presence of decoherence in the communication
channel, Bob requires classical information relating states of the communication channel to
states of Alice before the communication can begin.
The message-parsing functions that a minimal observer must encode in order to recognize
messages encoded in E are summarized in Fig. 1. As these functions must be available
at the outset of the observations, they must be encoded in executable form within |Or 〉.
The specification of |Or〉 in Eqn. 3, therefore, like the specification of |E i〉 in Eqn. 2,
involves a significant physical assumption. By specifying |Or〉, one is implicitly assuming
that the self-interaction HO−O of O is a Hamiltonian oracle, in the sense defined by Farhi
and Gutmann [20], that implements both a set {Pi} of parsers, each of which recognizes
environmental encodings of one of the Ai , and a further set {Rik} of parsers that recognize
and extract the particular values rik of the Ri from the output of the Pi. The sense in
which a physical system driven by a Hamiltonian oracle HO−O “implements” these parsers,
or implements any algorithm, is the familiar sense of classical computer science; the parsers
constitute a “virtual machine” running on O [21]. As Farhi and Gutmann point out, the
dynamics of any physical system “designed to solve a specified problem” - i.e. any system
that can be described as executing an algorithm - can be represented as a Hamiltonian oracle
([20], p. 2403); hence the notion that virtual machines are implemented by Hamiltonian
oracles is completely general. Specifying a virtual machine does not, however, specify the
Hamiltonian oracle that implements it. Any virtual machine can be implemented by an
infinite number of distinct physical systems [21], and hence by an infinite number of distinct
Hamiltonian oracles.
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|Or〉
❄
A1 signal?
No
b
b
b
❄
AN signal? ✲
No
❄
Extract R1
❄
❄
Extract RN
❄
Fig. 1: Functions required to parse a message from E
As are Equations 3 and 4, Fig. 1 is consistent with O making a single, effectively instan-
taneous observation. However, O’s task as described is to make multiple observations over
an extended period, and then to report the accumulated results. These task requirements
impose additional architectural constraints on the minimal O. In particular, performing
multiple observations requires both thatO maintain prior observations in a reliable memory,
and that O return reliably to |Or〉 at the end of each observation cycle. These requirements
are summarized in the functional decomposition of the extended observation task shown
in Fig. 2. Extended observation is a loop from |Or〉 back to |Or〉 with N + 1 conditional
branches. Three functional requirements for executing this loop are evident:
1. O must incorporate a reliable memory that stores not only the parsers {Pi} and {Rik}
required to recognize inputs and extract their reportable components, but also the
results rik, ordered by cycle and tagged by source, of executing these parsers.
2. O must implement a functional architecture capable of executing loops and input-
dependent conditional branching.
3. O’s functional architecture must specifically return O to |Or〉 following each memory-
write operation.
For a fixed, finite set of Ai and a fixed number of observation cyles, the architecture of
a classical finite-state machine with a fixed memory will meet these requirements. How-
ever, a general observer capable of carrying out the task of Fig. 2 for any observation
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period and any possible finite set of Ai cannot be assumed to pre-allocate memory for
all possible observation periods or to encode parsers for all possible Ai ; such an observer
must, therefore, incorporate a dynamically-allocatable memory and a capability to acquire
and store specifications of recognizers for new Ai not previously encountered. A minimal
observer capable of carrying out extended observations of multiple macroscopic systems
must, therefore, implement a functional architecture functionally equivalent to a classical
Turing Machine [21]. Specifying |Or〉 in Eqn. 3 therefore involves the significant physi-
cal assumption that the self-interaction HO−O is a Hamiltonian oracle that implements a
Turing-equivalent functional architecture.
✛|Or〉
❄
observing? ✲
No
❄
A1 signal?
No
b
b
b
❄
AN signal? b✲
No
Report records
❄
Flush records
b✲
❄
Extract R1
❄
Record R1
b
b
b
❄
Extract RN
❄
Record RN
b✲
Fig. 2: Functional decomposition of multiple-observation task
Turing-equivalent functional architectures permit a functional distinction between the “pro-
cessor” that executes algorithms and the associated “memory” that stores both executable
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specifications of algorithms and the results of running them. This functional distinction
allows the physical assumptions inherent in Eqn. 3 can be made more explicit. Let MO
refer to the physical memory components of O that change state on each observation cycle.
Indicating the state of MO following the jth memory-write operation as |MOj 〉, Eqn. 3
can be re-written as:
|e′f〉(|O
r〉|MOj 〉) → |e
′
f 〉(|O
r〉|MOj+1 〉) (5)
where the arrow represents not einselection by HO−E as in Eqn. 3, but rather the action over
the jth observation cycle of HO−O. It is clear from Eqn. 5 that the action of HO−O clones
|Or〉; therefore by the no-cloning theorem [22], |Or〉 not only encodes classical information
but must be a classical state. It is implicit in Eqn. 5 and clear from Fig. 2 that the action
of HO−O also clones the states of the j previously-written cells of M
O; therefore by the
no-cloning theorem MO must be a classical memory. The classicality results obtained by
Tegmark [23] by analyzing decoherence rates in mammalian nervous systems thus apply
equally to all minimal observers, solely in virtue of the task requirements of extended
observation. Writing down “|Or〉” in a von Neumann chain, therefore, by itself implies
the assumption of a classical minimal observer. As shown in the next section, this result
depends only on HO−O being a Hamiltonian oracle implementing message parsers on a
Turing-equivalent functional architecture, and is independent of any assumptions about
the dynamical structure of the environment beyond an absence of bias for a particular
coordinate system, including in particular the assumption of decoherence.
3 Quantum measurement by minimal observers
The analysis of observation as a task carried out in the previous section began with the
assumptions that E imposed strong decoherence and that both the A− E and O − E inter-
actions were well-defined. Equation 5 explicitly distinguishes O from E and hence requires
a well-defined O − E interaction, i.e. a well-defined O − E boundary; however, Eqn. 5
does not appeal to einselection and does not mention A. It is therefore worth asking if the
assumption of a well-defined A− E interaction, and in particular of a decohering A− E
interaction can be relaxed.
Suppose that “axiom(o)” [1, 5] is dropped and no “systems” other than O are assumed. De-
coherence then acts simultaneously at every possible compact (let us assume for simplicity)
boundary that does not overlap O, and pointer states of every possible compact assemblage
of quantum degrees of freedom, including all single degrees of freedom, not contained within
O are simultaneously encoded in the state of E . In this case, Equations 2 and 4 become
superfluous, the notion that |e′f〉 is an encoding of the states of some particular systems Ai
can be dropped, and Eqn. 5 can be re-written:
|E i〉(|Or〉|MOj 〉) → |E
i〉(|Or〉|MOj+1 〉) (6)
9
where as in Eqn. 5 the arrow represents the action of HO−O and therefore does not affect
|E i〉. Here |E i〉 is interpreted as simultaneously encoding the pointer states of every possible
compact assemblage of quantum degrees of freedom outside of O, but the physical situation
it describes is no different from that described by Eqn. 5. Re-writing the equation changes
nothing about the ambient photon field, for example, and nothing about the dispositions
of matter previously, but no longer, singled out and referred to as the “Ai”. If the physical
situation is unchanged, however, the response of O to that situation must be unchanged as
well. The parsers implemented by O produce the same outputs as before, and O reports
the same observational results, even though the boundaries of the Ai remain unspecified.
Zurek’s “axiom(o)” thus adds nothing to the physical situation. The system boundaries at
which decoherence acts do not need to be well-defined within the theory, and assuming well-
defined boundaries and hence well-defined A− E interactions is not required to accept Eqn.
3 or its derivatives Eqns. 5 and 6. Decoherence, however, is defined as a process that acts at
system-environment boundaries [1, 7, 8]. If well-defined A− E boundaries are unnecessary
to the description of measurement, decoherence and einselection are unnecessary as well.
If the assumptions of well-defined A− E boundaries and hence well-defined A− E interac-
tions, decoherence, and einselection - the assumptions that enabled the classical treatment
of the observation task in Sect. 2 - are all dropped, a “systems-free” formulation of the
O − E interaction results. The specification of |Or〉, with the concommitant assumption of
a Turing-equivalent functional architecture implemented by a Hamiltonian oracle, by itself
enforces LOCC in this systems-free formulation.
In the systems-free formulation, O’s ability to report the states of external “systems” Ai
rests entirely on the action of O’s parsers as implemented by the Hamiltonian oracle HO−O.
Let Oik = HO−E ◦ Pi ◦ Rik, where “◦” denotes composition and “Pi” and “Rik” are used
to denote the projections of HO−O that constitute the Hamiltonian oracles implementing
these parsers. Two facts about the set of operators {Oik} are evident from Fig. 2. First,
on any given cycle of observation, exactly one of the Oik will return a value rik, or else none
will. The Oik are, therefore, effectively orthogonal and together resolve the identity over
E . Second, the values rik can be represented as finite strings of classical bits, and hence,
without loss of generality, as positive integers. The {Oik} are therefore a POVM defined over
E . For each i, moreover, the subset {Oik} is a POVM that detects all and only the states
of E that are reported by O to encode signals from the “system” Ai implicitly defined by
the parser Pi; hence the subset {Oik} is an observable for Ai . Unlike traditional quantum-
mechanical observables such as Position, the Oik are not observer-independent and do not
act on “systems” external to the observer. Instead they act locally on O’s environment.
One of the motivating insights of quantum Darwinism - that observers interact with the
local environment, not with distant systems [4, 6] - thus follows as a consequence of the
assumption of minimal observers.
Suppose observers O(1 ) and O(2 ) implement POVMs {O
(1)
ik } and {O
(2)
ik } respectively, and
that:
∀i, k and ∀|E i〉,O
(1 )
ik |E
i〉 = O
(2 )
ik |E
i〉 = rik . (7)
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In this case {O
(1)
ik } and {O
(2)
ik } are output-equivalent and O
(1 ) and O(2 ) can be said to share
a POVM {Oik}. Multiple minimal observers will agree about an Ai present in their shared
environment if and only if they share a POVM {Oik} that outputs a single set {rik} of
values for the observable states of the read-out Ri . The notion of “objectivity” has been
defined within quantum Darwinism as:
“A property of a physical system is objective when it is:
1. simultaneously accessible to many observers,
2. who are able to find out what it is without prior knowledge about the
system of interest, and
3. who can arrive at a consensus about it without prior agreement.”
(p. 1 of [2]; p. 3 of [3])
A set of minimal observers that share POVMs will agree, using this definition, that the
states of the Ai they jointly observe are objective and hence effectively classical.
It was assumed at the outset that the environment E contains more degrees of freedom than
any observer O; hence O cannot, in principle, implement a recognizer for any environmen-
tal state |E i〉. Any minimal observer is, therefore, objectively ignorant as a consequence
of architecture of the state of the environment and cannot, even in principle, determine
whether environmental states encountered at two distinct times are the same. A minimal
observer cannot, moreover, infer anything about the dynamics of E except that they are
sufficient to generate the values of the rik obtained with the observables available to O. Any
finite sequence of observed values rik can be generated by an infinite number of distinct
finite state machines [19]; any one of which could be implemented by an infinite number
of distinct Hamiltonian oracles. The standard quantum-mechanical representation of any
total environmental state |E i〉 as an arbitrary superposition in an arbitrary basis can thus
be viewed as a consequence of the objective ignorance of minimal observers [24].
As shown by Zurek [13], provable ignorance on the part of observers generates the Born
rule. Zurek’s proof of the Born rule from envariance requires a controversial (e.g. [25])
a priori assumption of a course-graining defined over the system of interest on which a
classical probability measure sums to unity. For a minimal observer as defined here, an
orthogonal course-graining over any observable system Ai is provided by the POVM {Oik},
which as a resolution of the identity also provides a classical probability measure guaranteed
by the architecture of O to sum to unity. With this observer-specific course-graining and
the notation:
|Ri〉 =
∑
k
ξk |rik〉 (8)
where rik is the value of |Ri〉 recognized and extracted by O’s k
th Ai -specific POVM
component Oik, the Born rule becomes:
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Theorem (Born Rule): Pk = |ξk|
2.
The proof depends both on Ai and O interacting with E in an unbiased way and on O’s
inability to distinguish environmental states |ekj 〉 that encode |rik〉, and follows that given
in [13].
Proof : Let C be an ancillary “counter” of the environmental states |ekj 〉 that encode each
|rik〉. Assuming an Ai − E interaction that is unbiased with respect to coordinate system
and hence with respect to k, for a suitably large C the fractionMk of states in C that encode
each |rik〉 can be chosen as Mk = |ξk|
2 to an arbitrarily good approximation. Suppose that
O sequentially observes every state in C. At any stage in this process, the probability that
the next state observed will result in a report of rik is
Mk∑
k
Mk
=Mk = |ξk|
2 as required. 
4 Conclusion
This paper has examined the physical assumptions implicit in describing a temporally-
extended situation as “observation”, picking out a particular system O as an “observer”,
and specifying an initial state |Or 〉 as the observer “ready state”. It has focused on a
characterization of observation as a task described in classical terms. It shows that if
this classical characterization of observation as a temporally-extended task is accepted,
classical automata theory defines a minimal observer O: the self-interaction HO−O of O
must be a Hamiltonian oracle that implements a Turing-equivalent functional architecture,
and the ready state |Or〉must encode executable specifications of parsers that recognize and
extract reportable classical values from signals transmitted from the environment by the
O − E interaction. Minimal observers defined in this way are very familiar: any laboratory
data-collection system running on a general-purpose computer is a minimal observer in this
sense.
The paper then examines the physical assumptions that must be made, and the physical
assumptions that can be dropped, in the course of describing the physical interactions
between a macroscopic quantum system O that satisfies the definition of a minimal observer
and the surrounding environment E . It shows that the assumption of a minimal observer
by itself enforces LOCC. It shows that the parsers implemented by a minimal observer fully
determine both the external quantum systems Ai with which O can report interactions and
the read-out values rik that can be reported as observational results. It shows that these
parsers composed with the Hamiltonian HO−E, which must be well-defined but which need
not be specified explicitly, constitute POVMs and hence observables specific to the external
systems that O is capable of observing. It shows that multiple minimal observers will agree
about observational outcomes and hence about the “objectivity” of external systems if and
only if they share POVMs for those systems. Finally it shows, under the assumption that
physical interactions are not biased toward particular coordinate systems and hence basis
vectors, that the observations reported by O will comply with the Born Rule. None of these
demonstrations require any assumptions beyond the absence of bias to particular coordinate
systems about the interactions between E and any external systems, or any assumptions
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about einselection or decoherence. Hence these latter assumptions do not need to be made:
observation can be described in systems-free terms.
Minimal observers as defined here are quantum systems that exhibit intrinsically classical
behavior. All observed physics, however, is quantum; as Fuchs [12] somewhat poetically
puts it, the world has “zing”, and it is this “zing” that distinguishes the predictions of
quantum mechanics from, in Fuchs’ purely subjective framework, those of classical Bayesian
inference. In the present treatment, the source of this “zing” is the obligate, architecturally-
enforced ignorance that generates the Born rule. Minimal observers do not and cannot
implement recognizers for the environmental states |E i〉 with which they interact; hence
even if |E i〉 were not a quantum state and could be cloned, O could not, even in principle,
recognize it as cloned. Minimal observers cannot, therefore, replicate initial states of E ,
even if these states are classical; the probabilities given by the Born rule provide the full
extent of the knowledge O can obtain about physical causation. It is acknowledgement of
this obligate ignorance of |E i〉 on the part of observers, not any fact concerning dynamics,
that distinguishes quantum from classical mechanics in the systems-free formulation [24].
Treating the observer as a quantum system that implements a classical functional architec-
ture represents a profound departure from the von Neumann - Everett tradition of treating
the observer as an essentially unstructured quantum system, the states of which are en-
tirely determined by its entanglement with the environment. The difference between the
present treatment and the von Neumann - Everett tradition is interpretational, i.e. se-
mantic: the tradition treats observation as a physical interaction to be specified quantum
mechanically, while the present treatment defines observation as a physical interaction that
completes a task that is specified classically. The measurement problem arises in the tra-
ditional treatment because the description of observation as a physical interaction conflicts
with intuitions regarding what counts as an “outcome”, a “report” or an “experience” of
observation. These latter terms are not quantum-mechanical terms, but rather classical
terms that describe observation as a task to be performed. Hence the traditional treat-
ment demands a “Heisenberg cut” between quantum and classical descriptions, or else an
infinite tree of “branches” that specify classical outcomes. The present treatment resolves
the question of the “boundary” between quantum and classical descriptions in the simple
and familiar way that computer science resolves the question of the “boundary” between
a computer and its user interface: the task of observation is performed by a classical vir-
tual machine running on a quantum physical system. The observational capabilities of this
virtual machine, like the task it performs, are described classically. The underlying physi-
cal dynamics are described quantum mechanically, as the composition of the Hamiltonian
oracle HO−O with the observer-environment interaction HO−E . In this treatment, there is
no measurement problem; ”outcomes” and ”reports” are virtual-machine states that are
related to the underlying quantum dynamics by the Born rule.
The Hamiltonian oracles that implement minimal observers share a fundamental require-
ment: they must implement reliable memory. The traditional treatment of observation is
not concerned with the memory of the observer; indeed the traditional treatment can do
without observers. In the current treatment, reliable memory is a fundamental assumption;
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without reliable memory, the classical task of observation cannot be performed. Physical
interactions, however, cannot clone quantum states; hence perfectly reliable memory is im-
possible. Observation and hence science is feasible to the extent that observers can, as
Zurek [1] puts it, “readily consult the content of their memory” and regard the results of
such consultation as sufficiently reliable to proceed.
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